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Abstract: Informed by the third-level agenda setting 
model, also known as the Network Agenda Setting 
Model, this article contributes to our understanding 
of the dynamic between meanings by the leading 
national media and young opinion-influencers (media 
professionals and civil society members with public 
profiles) in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In focus are 
their meanings of Ukraine and its relations with the 
three Baltic countries and the EU. Our main findings—
bifurcated meanings building “storylines” about Ukraine 
in the Baltic region—raise the possibility that as the EU 
Baltic states become further embedded in the EU and 
as the next generation of leaders emerges, the resulting 
narratives will become more fractured and contested.
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 The EU’s Global Strategy1—its leading political communication docu-ment on the priorities of its foreign policy—signals a special place for 
its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods in the EU’s security architec-
ture. In this context, Ukraine remains an urgent unresolved case. Russia’s 
ongoing aggression against Ukraine means there is an unstable and large 
country of 47 million people on the EU’s eastern border. It also means 
complicated and fractured relations with Russia, once the EU’s major stra-
tegic geopolitical and trading partner, and an internally divided EU. The 
relevant literature2 reflects on how some EU member states firmly oppose 
Russian aggression and repeatedly call for resolute EU action against 
Russia. Other EU states, meanwhile, seek hidden or open alliances with 
Russia despite the conflict, which has resulted in 14,000 Ukrainian casual-
ties as of 2020.3 While earlier attempts by some EU member states to lobby 
for closer relations with Russia post-Crimea were more clandestine,4 recent 
years have witnessed a number of more open moves—including by major 
EU actors. Nord Stream 2 (a German-led project to provide Europe with 
gas while bypassing Ukraine) was ratified. The most recent period has also 
seen the warming of—and an increase in—interactions between French 
leader Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin as part 
of Macron’s vision of a “trust-building dialogue” with Russia’s leader.5 In 
March 2021, German Chancellor Merkel and Macron held a video confer-
ence with Putin to discuss, among other issues, the situation in Eastern 
Ukraine—in the absence of Ukraine and behind its back, over the oppo-
sition of Ukrainian diplomats.6 Yet a number of EU states—specifically 
1 European Union. 2016. “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” At http://eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, accessed September 23, 2019.
2 See Mai’a K. Davis Cross and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski. 2017. “What Type of Power 
Has the EU Exercised in the Ukraine–Russia Crisis? A Framework of Analysis.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 55:1: 3–19. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12442.
3 Robyn Dixon and Natalie Gryvnyak. “Ukraine’s Zelensky Wants to End a War in the 
East. His Problem: No One Agrees How to Do It.” Washington Post. March 20, 2020, 
At https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelensky-wants-to-end-a-war-
in-the-east-his-problem-no-one-agrees-how-to-do-it/2020/03/19/ae653cbc-6399-11ea-8a8e-
5c5336b32760_story.html, accessed December 16, 2020.
4 Mitchell A. Orenstein and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2016. “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy.” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 55: 1: 87–102. 
5 Anne-Sylvaine Chassany. “Macron’s Rapprochement with Putin Is Not Worth It.” Finan-
cial Times. October 1, 2020, At https://www.ft.com/content/168243c2-bac4-404c-843a-
ca1f61196049, accessed December 16, 2020.
6 Communiqué. 2021. “Call between the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Ma-
cron, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel, and the President 
of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.” Élysée Palace, March 30, At
 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/russia/news/article/communique-call-be-
tween-the-president-of-the-french-republic-emmanuel-macron; Peter Dickinson. 2021. “Pu-
tin Plots Ukraine Peace Talks without Ukraine,” At 
 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-plots-ukraine-peace-talks-without-
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Sweden, Poland, and the three Baltic states—continue to call for European 
unity in the face of Russian aggression, support Ukraine in its fight against 
Russia, and advocate for Ukraine’s future in the EU. The findings of this 
paper further complicate the picture: in one key piece of the picture, the 
Baltics, we find that meanings assigned by young future agenda-setters to 
Ukraine and its European aspirations/relations reflect growing detachment 
between their own states and Ukraine. These perceptions resonate with 
bifurcated meanings building “storylines” about Ukraine in the Baltic 
region, raising the possibility that as these states become further embed-
ded in the EU and as the next generation of leaders emerges, the resulting 
narratives will become more fractured and contested.
We draw upon a new theoretical model of third-level agenda setting,7 
also known as the Network Agenda Setting (NAS) Model,8 to understand 
the dynamic between meanings expressed by the leading national media 
(“what is public”) and young multipliers and influencers, who are media 
professionals and civil society members with public profiles (“what is in 
the heads”). The NAS Model was developed to understand evolving public 
sphere contexts with no strong agenda-setting effect within Western liberal 
media environments. The three Baltic states offer an excellent testing 
ground to explore “the association and relationship among different agenda 
items and measures how the overall object or attribute structure presented 
in the news influences the public’s cognitive picture.”9 In our research, 
we examine the parallels and resonances between media “storylines” 
(meanings that are already setting the public agenda) and the perceptions 
of multipliers and influencers (meanings that have the potential to shape 
the public agenda). Given the Baltic media’s reliance on international and 
regional wire services for news content on Ukraine (discussed below), 
media framing occurs not exclusively within the nation state, but rather 
through a network of regionally shared patterns and meanings. This builds 
on Entman and Usher’s10 notion that media frames do not move exclusively 
or linearly in national systems. It also adds to the NAS model, as those 
testing this model have heretofore not considered a regional dynamic in 
the third level of agenda-setting. Finally, we contribute to the emerging 
ukraine/.
7 Maxwell McCombs. 2014. Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion (2nd ed.). 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
8 H. Denis Wu and Lei Guo. 2020. “Beyond Salience Transmission: Linking Agenda Net-
works Between Media and Voters.” Communication Research 47: 7: 1010–1033. 
9 Lei Guo. 2013. “Toward the Third Level of Agenda Setting Theory: A Network Agenda 
Setting Model.” In Thomas J. Johnson, ed., Agenda Setting in a 2.0 World: New Agendas in 
Communication. New York: Routledge, 112-133 (cited in Wu and Guo, “Beyond Salience 
Transmission,” 1011).
10 Robert M. Entman and Nikki Usher. 2018. “Framing in a Fractured Democracy: Impacts 
of Digital Technology on Ideology, Power and Cascading Network Activation.” Journal of 
Communication 68: 2: 298-308. 
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tradition that engages with the NAS model in studies of post-Soviet and/
or European media systems.11
We further propose novel inter-disciplinary synergies that aim to 
explain an emerging network of meanings that are currently setting the 
public agenda and will do so in the future. Addressing the need to study 
the “mental mapping” of complex political realities specified in the intro-
ductory article, we assess cognitive, evaluative, and affective elements 
of the meanings behind the images of Self (three Baltic states) and Other 
(Ukraine) and their interactions (psychology studies theory by Hopmann),12 
and translate these into the characteristics of frames with high impact 
(communication studies theory by Entman):13 visibility and magnitude, 
local cultural resonance, and emotive charge. We argue that the compar-
ative matrix between cognitive, emotive, and evaluative Self-images 
vis-à-vis respective images of the Other and the subsequent framing of 
this comparison results in “storylines” of power, opportunity, and affinity 
that the Other presents to the Self (International Relations [IR] theory by 
Herrmann)14 in the media and among the multipliers and influencers. We 
trace how these “storylines” about Ukraine build on the constellations of 
meanings of perceived capability, opportunity, and affinity. 
We engage with a scholarly debate on the Baltic states as a “reliable” 
European “periphery” but never the “core”15 and a rich literature that 
argues that the three states share an identity of “liminal Europeanness”16 
(i.e. “Europe but not Europe” that is “ever becoming European,” an 
identity also found in Central and Eastern European post-communist 
countries). In this light, we explore how the “storylines” emerging from the 
networks of meanings created by agenda-setting media and multipliers and 
influencers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may use the case of Ukraine 
to add to the Baltic states’ arsenal of “strategies to move out of the liminal 
11 See, for example, Anastasia Kazun and Anton Kazun. 2019. “How State-Controlled Media 
Can Set the Agenda on the Internet: Coverage of Three Tragedies on Different Types of 
Russian Media.” Demokratizatsiya 27: 3: 371-98.
12 P. Terrence Hopmann. 1996. The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International 
Conflicts. Colombia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
13 Robert M. Entman. 2003. “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame 
After 9/11.” Political Communication 20: 4: 415–432.
14 Richard K. Herrmann. 2013. “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations.” 
In Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 334-363.
15 Dovile Jakniunaite. 2020. “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States.” In Alexander Filip-
pov, Nicolas Hayoz and Jens Herlth, eds., Centres and Peripheries in the Post-Soviet Space: 
Relevance and Meanings of a Classical Distinction. Bern: Peter Lang.
16 Viatcheslav Morozov. 2011. “Book Review. Reviewed Work: Russia’s European Agenda and 
the Baltic States. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series) by Janina Šleivyté.” 
Journal of Baltic Studies 42: 2 (June): 305–307. See also Alexander Filippov, Nicolas Hayoz, 
and Jens Herlth, eds. 2020, Centres and Peripheries in the Post-Soviet Space: Relevance and 
Meanings of a Classical Distinction. Bern: Peter Lang.
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condition.”17 We hypothesize four narratives that can be used strategically 
to move the identity debate in each Baltic state away from liminal and 
peripheral self-visions. In all hypothesized narratives, Ukraine—the Baltic 
states’ Other—is a vantage point for narratives of the Self.18
H1: Ukraine is used as a vantage point to re-affirm the 
unwavering trajectory of the Baltic states toward the 
European political and economic “core” and away from 
the “unreliable periphery” where Ukraine currently is 
(whether due to bad historical/political choices or its 
slow progress).
H2: Ukraine is used as a reference point to underline 
that the Baltic states are approaching the EU’s “core” by 
being Euro-enthusiastic members of the EU and NATO 
integration projects that are able to extend a helping 
hand to a “periphery” (in this case Ukraine) that is even 
more trapped between West and East than the three 
Baltic states.
H3: Ukraine is used as a reference point to present the 
three Baltic states as already being part of the European 
“core”—at least in the area of security, where these 
states can contribute to Europe’s security architecture 
and the EU’s common foreign policy in a major and 
unique way as experts on Russia and threats emanating 
therefrom.
H4: Ukraine is used as a reference point to present the 
three Baltic states as a “new core” for “peripheries” in 
17 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States.” See also Vineta Kleinberga and 
Elizabete Vizgunova. 2021. “Strategic Alignment: Latvian Media Narratives on Russia in 
the Context of Post-Maidan Ukraine.” New Zealand Slavonic Journal, forthcoming; Vineta 
Kleinberga. 2020. “On Its Path to Become ‘North European’: Political Climate Change Nar-
rative in Latvia.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 12: 3: 24-34; 
Pauline S. Heinrichs. 2021. “Agency and the Strategic Negotiation of Futures: Evidence from 
Latvia.” New Zealand Slavonic Journal, forthcoming; Gintaras Šumskas. 2021. “Portraying 
Russia on Lithuanian Internet Media: The Supply and Demand Side.” New Zealand Slavonic 
Journal, forthcoming; Maili Vilson. 2020. “Framing the EU and the Green Deal: A Balancing 
Act of the Estonian Government.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
12: 3: 35-46.
18 See also Heinrichs and Sabatovych in this issue.
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the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, on the grounds 
that they are “models/examples” of successful post-
Soviet transformation.
Consideration of these four strategic “storylines” contributes to the concep-
tualization of an identity narrative—a level within the strategic narrative 
theory that informs this Special Issue.19 We define strategic narrative as a 
“tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, 
and change the discursive environments in which they operate.”20 Through 
strategic narratives, a political actor seeks to be an actor “other nations 
listen to, rely on and emulate out of respect and admiration.”21 Strategic 
narratives are not “things given” but “processes ensuing”: making Ukraine 
a reference point for the Baltic agenda-setters allows them to shift from 
current identity narratives dominated by self-visions of liminality and 
periphery toward identity narratives that steadily approach the European 
“core” (or are even already in the “core”). After all, the strategic narrative 
definition of this level is: “identities of actors in international affairs that 
are in a process of constant negotiation and contestation.”22 The NAS 
Model helps us argue that the resonance between the two types of mean-
ings—those already setting the public agenda and those multipliers and 
influencers with prospects of shaping it—has strong potential to either 
change existing strategic narratives, specifically on the identity level of the 
model, or to support and reinforce them. As such, we ask:
1. What “storylines” appear in the Baltic news media about 
Ukraine in terms of Ukraine’s perceived capability, opportu-
nity, and affinity?
2. Are these “storylines” country-specific? Or is there the 
potential for shared, regional “storylines”? 
3. Do the meanings conveyed by media “storylines” resonate 
with the opinions of young multipliers and influencers? 
4. What do resonances and clashes between agenda-setting 
discourses and young agenda-setters mean for the formulation 
and projection of a strategic narrative on the identity level in 
these countries and the region and for these countries’ relations 
19 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. 2013. Strategic Narratives, 
Communication Power, and the New World Order. New York: Routledge.
20 Ibid., 2.
21 Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2011. “Preface.” In Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, eds., A 
National Strategic Narrative. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for 
Scholars, 2-4, At http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strate-
gic%20Narrative.pdf, 4.
22 Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic Narratives, Communication Power, and 
the New World Order, 7.
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with Ukraine?
The paper starts by detailing our theoretical framework and the 
resulting operationalizations. We elaborate the four hypothesized narra-
tives before moving to methodology and analysis of frames and media 
“storylines” about Ukraine—broken out into political, economic, and 
social issue-areas—that appear in news media texts and the opinions of 
young multipliers and influencers in the Baltic region. We conclude with 
a discussion in which we revisit our analytical framework and discuss our 
main findings. We examine what a contradictory image of Ukraine in both 
sets of agenda-setting meanings means for strategic identity narratives as 
well as for Ukraine-Baltic and Ukraine-EU relations in an increasingly 
fragmented EU foreign policy. We also discuss similarities between the 
networks of meanings found in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a finding 
that allows us to conclude with an argument for a possible regional 
network of meanings surpassing national networks. Finally, we outline 
future research directions, including inviting other scholars to assess 
narratives of Ukraine in other EU member states and regions to see to what 
extent they are different or cohesive.
Theoretical Framework
We contribute to a deeper understanding of strategic narratives—and 
specifically to their dynamic character as process and scope of conditions 
for change. This study also engages with the latest development in the 
communication field: third-level agenda setting theory,23 known as the 
Network Agenda Setting (NAS) Model.24 According to Guo, while “[t]
raditional agenda-setting research focuses on the transfer of salience of 
individual objects or attributes that describe a given object, the NAS model 
turns the attention to the interrelationships between different elements 
constructed in the media and those in the public’s minds.”25 It focuses 
on the “association and relationship among different agenda items” and 
assesses “how the overall object or attribute structure presented in the 
news influences the public’s cognitive picture.”26 Linking to the cognitive 
science position that “humans’ mental representation resemble a network-
like structure,”27 the NAS Model asserts that “the ways in which the news 
media associate different agendas will affect how the public associates 
these agendas as well.” Additionally, “the salience of issues or attributes 
23 McCombs, Setting the Agenda.
24 Wu and Guo, “Beyond Salience Transmission.”
25 Guo, “Toward the Third Level of Agenda Setting Theory.”
26 Wu and Guo, “Beyond Salience Transmission,” 1011.
27 John R. Anderson. 1983. “A Spreading Activation Theory of Memory.” Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior 22: 3: 261-295. 
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can also be transferred from the public to the media in interactive media 
environments.”28
Adding to the NAS Model, we apply it to understand meaning 
interactions in a specific region of Europe: the three EU Baltic states. 
Specifically, we trace how the news media in these democratic, open 
Western media environments29 “bundle sets of objects or attributes”30 
into “storylines” about Ukraine and its relations with Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, and the EU (meanings that currently set the public agenda). We 
also track whether these “storylines” are salient in the minds of particular 
members of the public. We focus on those who can set agendas themselves 
(media professionals and civil society representatives), often in interactive 
media environments (i.e., with the potential to shape the public agenda). 
This theoretical position adds to the conceptual toolbox of the NAS Model, 
providing a novel link to strategic narrative theory. It helps to identify 
“bundles” of meanings that form coherent “storylines” with the potential 
to reinforce or contest existing strategic narratives by “proving underlying 
connections and making them salient to the audience.”31 The potential 
for a change of strategic narrative increases when the salience of issues 
and attributes linked in a particular way in media “storylines” resonates 
with the salience of issues and attributes linked in the same way among 
members of the public who are agenda-setters. Our focus is a specific level 
of strategic narrative conceptualization: the identity level.
In both cases of our analysis—meanings that are already public and 
setting agendas through the media, as well as meanings behind percep-
tions among multipliers and influencers—we consider the combination of 
cognitive, normative, and emotive image elements (political psychology 
concepts).32 Importantly, this combination has also been adopted by the 
image theory of IR.33 In this article, we define image as a “reference to 
some aspects of the world, which contains within its own structure and in 
terms of its own structure a reference to the act of cognition that generated 
it. It must say, not that the world is like this, but that it was recognized 
28 Sharon Meraz. 2011. “Using Time Series Analysis to Measure Intermedia Agenda-Setting 
Influence in Traditional Media and Political Blog Networks.” Journalism & Mass Commu-
nication Quarterly 88: 1: 176-194. 
29 See Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini. 2004. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models 
of Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Roger Blum. 2005. 
“Bausteine zu einer Theorie der Mediensysteme.” Medienwissenschaft Schweiz 16: 2: 5-11.
30 Luo Guo, Hong Tien Vu, and Maxwell McCombs. 2012. “An Expanded Perspective on 
Agenda-Setting Effects: Exploring the Third Level of Agenda Setting.” Revista de Comuni-
cación 11: 51-68.
31 Wu and Guo, “Beyond Salience Transmission,” 1012.
32 Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts.
33 Kenneth E. Boulding. 1956. The Image. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press; 
Kenneth E. Boulding. 1959. “National Images and International Systems.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 3: 2: 120–31.
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to have been like this by the image-maker.”34 We engage with the images 
elements specifically through this lens of their importance to the flow of 
international political communication. Images may be evaluative (beliefs 
about good and bad); affective (emotion-based feelings of like and dislike 
toward others); or cognitive (beliefs about the world and those occupying 
it).35 We further engage with Kotsopulous,36 who proposes to link cognitive 
images to “images of adversary,” “self-images,” and “images of situation” 
(quoting Jönsson’s IR negotiation theory.37 In our case study, Ukraine is 
not an “adversary” to the Baltics. As such, our theorization puts forward a 
slightly different conceptual paradigm for the cognitive element of images: 
a) self-images of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; b) images of the Other 
(Ukraine) in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and c) images of the situa-
tion involving the Other (Ukraine) exclusively or Self-Other interactions, 
including the historical memory of this interaction.38
Engaging with the scholarship studying political communication 
focused on foreign policy, and specifically with the theorization of 
framing foreign policy-related information flows, we follow Entman, who 
defines frames as “selection of some aspects of perceived reality to make 
them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment recommendation.”39 Of specific interest to us is a set of 
characteristics that assist in making a framing of a foreign policy actor or 
event more impactful. Following Entman, we explore framing of Ukraine 
in terms of magnitude and visibility, local cultural resonance, and emotive 
charge40 to track meanings that are already “public.” We argue that by 
analyzing visibility and magnitude, we may get an insight into which 
cognitive elements of Ukraine’s images were selected for communication. 
In our analysis, we will assess the visibility of particular representations 
of Ukraine (Other for the Baltic states), Baltic states in relation to Ukraine 
(Self), and the situation around Ukraine (either around Ukraine exclusively, 
or around Ukraine’s relations with the Baltic states, the EU or the world). 
34 Harold Cohen. n.d. “What Is an Image?,” At http://aaronshome.com/aaron/publications/
whatisanimage.pdf, accessed June 30, 2021.
35 Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts.
36 John Kotsopulous. 2020. “South African Perceptions of the EU and UK after Brexit.” In 
Natalia Chaban, Arne Niemann, and Johanna Speyer, eds., Changing Perceptions of the EU 
at Times of Brexit: Global Perspectives. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 17.
37 Christer Jönsson. 1990. Communication in International Bargaining. London: Pinter, 
145-147.
38 See also Natalia Chaban, Svitlana Zhabotynska, and Michèle Knodt. 2019. “Frames and 
Narratives: Conceptualizing Cultural Congruence.” Paper presented at International Studies 
Association (ISA), Toronto, Canada, March 27-30, At https://jeanmonnet.nz/rcx-eu/dissemi-
nation-activities/jm-chair-conferences, accessed December 16, 2020.
39 Robert Entman. 1993. “Framing: Towards the Understanding of the Fractured Paradigm.” 
Journal of Communication 43: 4: 51‒58. 
40 Entman, “Cascading Activation.”
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The category of local cultural resonance is linked to the representations 
of interactions between each of the three Baltic states (Self) and Ukraine 
(Other). But perhaps more importantly, we link this category to the eval-
uative image component by considering representations of the resonance 
(or dissonance) of Ukraine’s norms and values with the norms and values 
possessed by the Baltic states. Finally, the framing category of emotive 
charge is direcly linked to the emotive image element. Media representa-
tions of Ukraine (the Other), the Baltic Self (in relation to the Other), and 
their interactions communicate certain emotions further shaping the image 
of Ukraine.
Arguably, cognitive, emotive, and evaluative self-images vis-à-vis 
cognitive, emotive, and evaluative images assigned by the Self to the Other 
create a matrix of comparisons. In this matrix, the Other could be presented 
as being stronger (or weaker) than the Self, offering opportunities (or 
threats) to the Self, and being superior (or inferior) to the Self (following 
IR’s image theory paradigm)41 (see Table 1). Importantly, to justify rela-
tive capability, opportunity, and status, historical insight is often needed, 
whether on a short-, medium-, or long-term scale. Such a perspective 
allows storylines of power, interest and affinity of Other vis-à-vis Self to 
appear. We argue that these “storylines” are not yet strategic narratives. The 
“storylines” of power, interest, and affinity can feed into existing strategic 
narratives, either reinforcing them or contributing to the creation of new 
ones and (con)testing their viability. 
 In this research, the agenda-setting “storylines” with reference to 
Ukraine (the Other) are not interpreted as determining how meaning is 
made in news discourse, by elite actors, or by members of the public. 
Given that these are open, pluralist societies, such “storylines” can only 
be interpreted as constituting one possible strategy (albeit a major one) 
for shifting the identity narratives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from 
“eternally liminal reliable periphery” to “belonging to the core.” Moreover, 
in these open societies, such “storylines” may well carry elements that 
either support the main strategic narrative formulations and projections by 
state-level communicators, particularly in the foreign policy/international 
relations domain, or undermine them (see Table 1). 
There remains the major question of whether a network of mean-
ings can be asserted here given the porousness of modern-day media 
systems. Building on Entman and Usher’s42 argument that media frames 
do not move exclusively in national systems, we will test whether there 
is evidence for a bounded regional network of meanings that can “shift” 
the shared identity narratives from being a “reliable liminal periphery” 
of Europe to steadily approaching the European “core” and even being 
41 See Hermann, “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations.”
42 Entman and Usher, “Framing in a Fractured Democracy.”
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already at the “center.” We hope to add an innovative conceptualization to 
the NAS Model that specifically explores geopolitically cohesive regions 
(in our case, post-Soviet EU member states on the shores of the Baltic Sea). 
Table 1. Summary of Theoretical Positions
“In our heads” 
(meanings that 
have the poten-
tial to shape the 
public agenda)
Characteristics 















exclusively or  
about Ukraine’s 
relations with 
a Baltic state, 
the EU, or the 
world)
Evaluative






































Of norms of 








the Other and 
of the Self in 
relation to the 
Other
STORYLINES Characteristic 





Story of power/capability (strong or weak)
Story of interest/opportunity (benefit or threat)
Story of affinity/status (superior or inferior)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
All unfolding in time
Strategic 
narratives
Identity level of strategic narrative and its potential 
change 
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of research and preexisting 
scholarship.
EU Baltic States and Ukraine: Contexts and Narratives 
The Baltic states are a special case within the EU, as they are the only 
former Soviet republics in the EU. There is a broad—political, academic, 
and public—discussion concerning each of the three Baltic states’ narra-
tives of identity in the context of post-Soviet transformation and accession 
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to/membership in the EU. Systematic review of this vast scholarly discus-
sion is beyond the scope of this paper, yet the relevant literature, while 
acknowledging country-specific differences between the three countries, 
points to one common outlook: the “never-ending becoming” (fully) 
European, also known as the continuous liminality of the Baltic countries 
(as well as the Central and Eastern European countries) within the EU. 
This shared identity outlook of “liminal Europeanness”43—a historical 
legacy of the Western European Enlightenment, which invented and juxta-
posed Western (superior) and Eastern (inferior) Europe—occurs against 
a background of similar experiences in the Soviet past; drastic political, 
normative, and socio-economic transformations after the collapse of the 
USSR; and simultaneous accession to the EU in 2004. These striking 
historical similarities are reinforced by parallels in the small size of these 
countries, their strategic geopolitical location on the shores of the Baltic 
Sea, uneasy relations with the Russian Federation as a regional “hegemon” 
and a factor in Baltic security, and the presence of Russian-speaking 
minorities who stayed in those countries after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union—with larger groups in Latvia (33.8%) and Estonia (29.8%), and 
a smaller group in Lithuania (8%).44 Our study adds to the debate on the 
three Baltic states’ “strategies to move out of the liminal condition.”45 
Specifically, we “audition” Ukraine as a critical reference-point by which 
each Baltic state might forge its respective post-liminal identity narrative 
in their quests “to find the settled relation with the European core and 
distance themselves from Russia, the constant threat in their security imag-
inaries.”46 The most recent literature in the field argues that in the “process 
of finding the space and place in Europe and regarding Russia,” the current 
ambition of the three Baltic states is to create “representations of the 
reliable peripheries which are able to actively shape their subject position 
and formulate their own initiatives and ideas though never ever trying to 
become what they cannot—the centre.”47 In our study, we argue that the 
case of Ukraine offers a strategic opportunity for the three Baltic states to 
move their identity narratives from “belonging to a reliable periphery” to 
“being closer to the core,” or even “being in the core.” We hypothesize 
43 Morozov, “Book Review.” See also Filippov, Hayoz and Herlth, Centres and Peripheries 
in the Post-Soviet Space.
44 CIA World Factbook, At https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/, accessed June 30, 2021.
45 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States.” See also Kleinberga and Vizguno-
va, “Strategic Alignment: Latvian Media Narratives on Russia in the Context of Post-Maidan 
Ukraine”; Kleinberga, “On Its Path to Become “North European”: Political Climate Change 
Narrative in Latvia”; Heinrichs, “Agency and the Strategic Negotiation of Futures: Evidence 
from Latvia”; Šumskas, “Portraying Russia on Lithuanian Internet Media: The Supply and 
Demand Side”; Vilson, “Framing the EU and the Green Deal: A Balancing Act of the Estonian 
Government.”
46 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States”.
47 Ibid.
Ukraine through a Baltic Lens 13
four shared identity narratives circulating in the public opinion-making 
discourses in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in this regard. 
Hypothesis 1: As part of the EU, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are 
developed economies with favorable rankings on human development, 
civil liberties, press freedom, and other markers of successful Western 
democratic societies. Estonia, in particular, is notable for its technologi-
cally advanced economy with free education and universal healthcare for 
its citizens. As argued by a voluminous literature since the 1990s, the three 
Baltic states are taking on board the narrative of belonging to “Nordic” 
Europe (stereotypically associated with the image of strong liberal democ-
racies) while attempting to move away from being labelled as “Central” 
and/or “Eastern” Europe. In contrast, Ukraine is not a full member of the 
EU and has struggled to disentangle itself from Russia, as evidenced by 
the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Ukraine has also faced endemic govern-
ment corruption and is one of the poorest countries in Europe.48 It could 
be argued that Ukraine and its near neighbors have taken divergent paths, 
with the Baltic states “returning to Europe” (even if only to its periphery) 
in normative, political, and economic terms while Ukraine finds itself “not 
yet fully in Europe” due to bad decisions, flawed governance, or unfor-
tunate circumstances at key historical intersections. Alternatively, one 
could argue that Ukraine is simply at a different point on the same path, as 
some of the critical juncture narratives in this Special Issue contend.49 We 
hypothesize that, in this context, the three Baltic states’ public discourses in 
the domain of strategic messaging (including news media) may reference 
Ukraine as a vantage point to reaffirm these states’ own firm trajectory 
toward the European normative, political, and economic “core” and away 
from the “unreliable periphery” in which Ukraine currently finds itself. 
Hypothesis 2: The three Baltic states have forged a distinct image 
within the EU as active and Euro-enthusiastic nations. Arguably, this 
position is part of their strategy to settle relations with the European core50 
and signal a move closer to the “core” of the EU, as well as to overcome 
their contested “Europeanness” as post-Soviet and post-socialist states 
caught between East and West.51 This is in contrast to some other member 
states (including “old” member states from the “core” of Europe) that are 
now seen to either be or be becoming more Eurosceptic. In this narrative, 
the Baltic states see EU (and NATO) enlargement as a way to shift from 
48 Anders Åslund. 2019. “What is Wrong with the Ukrainian Economy?” Atlantic Council, At 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/what-is-wrong-with-the-ukrainian-econ-
omy, accessed December 16, 2020.
49 See Heinrichs and Sabatovych in this issue.
50 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States.”
51 See, e.g., Maria Mälksoo. 2009. “Liminality and Contested Europeanness: Conflicting 
Memory Politics in the Baltic Space.” In Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, eds., Identity and Foreign 
Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration. London: Routledge, 65-84.
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“existential politics to normal politics.”52 And while this shift is “far from 
being accomplished,”53 Ukraine remains overlooked either as a candidate 
for EU enlargement or NATO membership. We hypothesize that agenda-set-
ting media discourse, as well as the discourse of multipliers and influencers 
in the three Baltic states, may formulate a narrative about distinctly Euro-
enthusiastic “Baltic voices” heard in Europe in support of Ukraine’s future 
membership of the EU and NATO—both country-specific and resonating 
across the region. Such a narrative would communicate a particular stra-
tegic self-vision of each of the three states, namely that these states are 
approaching the European “core” by virtue of their membership of exclusive 
“Western clubs” and their ability to extend a helping hand to a “periphery” 
that is even more stuck between West and East than the three Baltic states.
Hypothesis 3: The Baltic states’ vision of Russia as “the constant 
threat in their security imaginaries”54 opens up yet another strategic 
opportunity for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to use the case of Ukraine 
to signal a move away from liminality and periphery. In this case, the 
Baltic states can contribute to Europe’s security architecture and common 
foreign policy in a major and unique way and frame themselves as experts 
in Eastern European security and Russia matters, with high-level exper-
tise and a nuanced understanding of the threat coming from their Eastern 
neighbor. We hypothesize that agenda-setting media discourse, as well as 
the discourse of multipliers and influencers in the three Baltic states, will 
use Ukraine as a reference to frame state identity in this light.
Hypothesis 4: With their first-hand experience of “being framed as 
simultaneously in Europe and not quite European,”55 the Baltic states have 
arguably succeeded in creating for themselves the image of a “reliable 
periphery” for Europe.56 Meanwhile, volatile Ukraine—another Eastern 
European state “betwixt and between”57 East and West and a turbulent 
“periphery” in Europe’s self-imagination—has not achieved such status. 
Our final hypothesis is that agenda-setting media discourse, as well as the 
discourse of multipliers and influencers in the three Baltic states, will use 
the case of Ukraine to present the Baltic states as “models/examples” for 
how other European peripheries can become a “reliable” part of Europe. 
As such, while the three Baltic states may be “never ever the centre” of 
Europe,58 they may already have turned themselves into a new “center” for 
52 Mälksoo, “From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged 
Europe,” 275.
53 Ibid.
54 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States.”
55 Mälksoo, “From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged 
Europe”, 275
56 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States”.
57 Turner (1969), cited in Mälksoo, “From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The 
Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe,” 275
58 Jakniunaite, “Permanent Periphery of the Baltic States.”
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“peripheries” comprised of post-Soviet states like Ukraine. Such a projec-
tion would resonate well in the world of growing global multipolarity.
Method
The data for our analysis came from a transnational Jean Monnet Research 
Project, “Youth Opinion and Opportunities for EU Public Diplomacy: 
Youth Narratives and Perceptions of the EU and EU-Ukraine Relations in 
Ukraine and the Three Baltic States” (E-YOUTH).59 The project observed 
daily coverage of Ukraine in the three Baltic states and compared their 
media framing of Ukraine to the framing of the three Baltic states and 
the EU in Ukrainian news media. The project also interviewed young 
national decision-, policy- and opinion-makers from the political, media, 
and civil society spheres in the three Baltic states and Ukraine. Following 
the UN definition of “youth,” all respondents were under 33 years old.60 
The project compared their opinions of each other and examined these 
opinions vis-à-vis frames of Ukraine, the three Baltic states, and the EU 
communicated by the national media. Data collection was guided by the 
project’s key objective of studying youth opinion and constrained by the 
project’s budget and time available. 
Media Analysis
The media systems of the three Baltic states have experienced turbulent 
transformations throughout their history. After the collapse of the USSR in 
1991, the three states embarked on profound media reforms. As of 2020, 
the Index of Press Freedom ranked Estonia #14 in the world, Latvia #22 
and Lithuania #28 out of 174 countries. As part of the Western democratic 
liberal media environment, media in each of the three Baltic states employ 
“bottom-line” policies and engage in pragmatic cost-cutting strategies. 
These typically include using a range of cost-effective news sources, 
especially when it comes to the reporting of international news. When it 
59 E-YOUTH, Jean Monnet Project, Erasmus+, European Commission, At https://jeanmonnet.
nz/eyouth/2018-2020, extended to 2021 due to Covid-19. We express our gratitude to the 
E-YOUTH researchers who collected the media and interview datasets: Vineta Kleinberga, 
Elizabete Vizgunova, Dr Gintaras Šumskas, Vlad Vernygora, Dr Viktor Velivchenko, and 
E-YOUTH Data Manager Dr Iana Sabatovych. We are also grateful to Sam Brett for prelim-
inary media content analysis.
60 According to the United Nations (UN), “There is no universally agreed international definition 
of the youth age group.” Citing “statistical purposes,” the UN—“without prejudice to any other 
definitions made by Member States”—defines “youth” as persons between the ages of 15 and 24 
(see https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/youth). However, the UN recognizes that the “operational 
definition and nuances of the term ‘youth’ vary from country to country, depending on relative socio-
cultural, institutional, economic and political factors.” With no consensus in place, the E-YOUTH 
project, after considering a number of age classifications in the relevant literature, differen-
tiated between adolescents (between the ages of 13 and 19) and young adults (between the 
ages of 19 and 32). 
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comes to the reporting of events in Ukraine, the E-YOUTH project discov-
ered that the three Baltic states draw on a specific range of news sources. 
Significantly, the media environments of the three Baltic states use news 
agencies that are owned by companies in one of the Baltic states (Estonia), 
yet sell news into the other Baltic states in their own languages. Moreover, 
these news agencies have news bureaus in other Baltic states and employ 
local journalists. In addition to Delfi, Estonian outlets have a significant 
presence across all three countries through the Postimees Media Group. 
This group owns 15min in Lithuania, TVnet and LETA in Latvia, and 
Postimees in Estonia. It also owns the BNS news agency, which distributes 
stories across the Baltic states. 
The project prioritized a particular source of media images of 
Ukraine in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and of the three Baltic states 
in Ukraine: the most popular e-news platforms (see Table 2). Given the 
project’s aim of studying perceptions among youth, e-sources of news were 
chosen due their reputation as a medium more popular than traditional 
media among young people seeking to learn about current events. As such, 
the E-YOUTH project did not engage with traditional media. Social media 
were also outside the scope of the E-YOUTH project. In this article, we 
engage with the sample collected after observing coverage of Ukraine on 
the most popular e-news platforms in the three Baltic states: LSM.lv, Delfi.
lv and Tvnet.lv in Latvia; 15min.lt, Delfi.lt and lrytas.lt in Lithuania, and 
Delfi.ee, Postmees.ee and err.ee in Estonia. For an article to be included in 
our sample, it had to reference “Ukraine” (our key search term)—but one 
brief reference was sufficient for inclusion.
A relatively short period of media observation—January 15 to 
February 15, 2019—was dictated by the project’s timeline and limited 
budget. Still, this short period of observation featured several key polit-
ical events for Ukraine and was dominated by news about the upcoming 
presidential elections in Ukraine and the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict with the seizure of two Ukrainian navy vessels by the Russian 
military in the Sea of Azov. Both events attracted intense media attention in 
the three Baltic states, due not least to their leaders’ immediate vociferous 
condemnation of Russia’s capture of the Ukrainian ships and sailors. The 
latter also fed into the narratives of constant Russian threat to the security 
imaginaries of the three Baltic states and these states’ status as experts on 
security matters in the region.
Media sources were observed daily by a team of pre-trained local 
researchers: one researcher in Lithuania and Estonia, respectively, and two 
researchers in Latvia. Training involved a three-day practice in a face-to-
face format, followed by a series of webinars, a pilot of one week’s media 
observation, a pilot debrief session, and a second three-day face-to-face 
training discussing the main results and fine-tuning the media dataset. 
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The project also had a data manager who oversaw media data analysis on 
a daily basis and undertook random double-coder reliability checks. In 
total, 471 articles—all referencing Ukraine—were studied (see Table 2).
Table 2. Media Sample
Lithuania Estonia Latvia
Delfi 28 Delfi 55 Delfi 85
15min 32 Postimees 74 LSM 40
Lrytas 19 ERR 84 TVnet 54
Total 79 Total 213 Total 179
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of research.
Table 3. Degree of Centrality in Reporting on Ukraine




























57 19 3 58 48 73 68 65 80
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of research.
Assessing the intensity of the discussion about Ukraine on the entire 
agenda, our analysis discovers country-specific patterns to how national 
e-news media platforms assign the degree of centrality to Ukraine (see 
Table 3). 
While the Lithuanian sample is the smallest of the three considered 
here, it shows a strong trend toward greater intensity in reporting on 
Ukraine (just 3.8% of the sample reported only briefly on Ukraine). In 
contrast, popular e-news engines in Latvia and Estonia have more volu-
minous samples in the same period of observation, yet they feature less 
intensive representation of Ukraine, with 41% and 37.5% of the samples, 
respectively, referencing Ukraine only in passing. 
Assessing the sources of news, Delfi almost never sourced stories 
from agencies. Postimees used some foreign agencies, such as AFP, in a 
small number of stories; it also occasionally used the Russian news agency 
Interfax, though never as a sole source. ERR used BNS for some of its 
stories, often in conjunction with foreign agencies or its own reporters.
Interviews with Opinion-Formers
Interviews with young decision-, policy- and opinion-makers from the 
political, media, and civil society sectors were also part of the E-YOUTH 
research project. As mentioned above, all interviewees had to be under 33 
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years old. The project budget allowed for 10 interviews per country. This 
article engages with perceptions among multipliers and influencers from 
two opinion-forming cohorts: media professionals (editors and journalists) 
and civil society actors (those who are active on various platforms influ-
encing the opinions of others). In this study, we consider 17 interviews 
with multipliers and influencers (out of 30 total interviews in the Baltic 
segment of the E-YOUTH project). The choice of respondents followed 
their distinct profiles as multipliers and influencers in each country, as 
assessed by the local research teams in each country. Importantly, the final 
sample remains random, as some multipliers and influencers approached 
for interviews declined the invitation. 
The interviews were conducted in the three Baltic countries by 
pre-trained local researchers. All interviews were face-to-face and 
semi-structured; all followed Human Ethics guidelines. To comply with 
ethics requirements, all quotations below are de-identified. The ques-
tionnaire used in Estonia, Latvia, and Latvia was identical to ensure that 
comparisons would be valid. Questionnaires asked respondents about 
their sources of news about Ukraine, as well as their perceptions of their 
country’s relationships with Ukraine (historical and current), Ukraine’s 
relations with the EU and its aspirations to join the Union, and the role 
and future of the EU and the Baltic states in regional, European, and global 
leadership. The responses were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using 
qualitative interpretative analysis. 
Operationalizations
In our media analysis, informed by framing theory, we operationalized 
visibility in terms of the volume of articles (number of articles that covered 
Ukraine exclusively and Ukraine in the context of the three Baltic states) 
and degree of centrality of representation (of Ukraine and of each Baltic 
state). The content analysis of the media texts also coded for situation, 
namely the actors involved, the type of action in an issue area, location of 
the action, presence of the conflict, and if the conflict was reported with 
reference to a resolution proposed and/or a solution found. 
Analysis of media and interview texts investigated how the three 
cognitive image elements—the Self, the Other, and the situation—were 
framed. Local resonance was operationalized by coding for whether or 
not Ukraine was reported to interact with a Baltic state. In addition, our 
analysis observed whether or not Ukraine was represented as upholding the 
norms of peace, democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights, 
freedom/liberty, solidarity, equality, and sustainability. This correlated with 
the evaluative element within the image.
Emotive charge was operationalized by tracking representations 
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of Ukraine in the Baltic states according to a range of emotive indica-
tors: positive, positive-to-neutral, neutral, neutral-to-negative, negative, 
and mixed. Language expression was the main indicator used to assess 
sentiment and emotive coloring (literal and metaphoric descriptors were 
examined by the pre-trained coders). Thus did we address the affective 
element of the image.
Interpretative analysis of the frames of Self and Other (Ukraine) in 
cognitive, emotive, and evaluative terms produced various “storylines” of 
the capability (or weakness) of Ukraine, the opportunity (or threat) it pres-
ents to a given Baltic state, and its affinity for (or inferiority to) these states.
Media “Storylines”
These broad “storylines” (see Table 4) closely reflect aspects of the stra-
tegic narratives discussed above, although with significant differences of 
emphasis and some distinctive patterns in each country. We make three 
main points about how news media in each country framed Ukraine. First, 
politics dominated, although in a complex mix of representations in which 
Ukraine was alternately a victim of Russian aggression, a threat to the 
security of the country, and an opportunity. Second, there was a wide range 
of economic stories, but in each “storyline” the country’s media tended 
to be more concerned with the domestic impact than with Ukraine itself; 
Ukraine was strongly refracted through a local lens. Third, the resulting 
framing of Ukraine is very uncertain in all three respects in which we 
analyzed the texts: cognitive, emotive, and normative. Ukraine is at once 
capable and weak, an opportunity and a threat, “like us” and “not like us.”
Before expanding on these points, it should be noted that there is 
a continuum in the coverage. Estonian news media contain many more 
stories (213) than Lithuanian media (79). Estonian media were also more 
likely to use a positive tone in portraying Ukraine—the tone was positive 
more than half the time, with the remaining stories mostly neutral or mixed. 
Its outlets were also very likely to use local “hooks” for their stories and 
more likely to represent Estonia as a major actor. By contrast, Lithuanian 
news media represented Ukraine as a major actor far more than as a 
secondary or minor one. Its outlets were also the most varied of the three in 
terms of how they covered Ukraine, with both positive and neutral stories, 
though seldom negative ones. Local hooks were much rarer, with Ukraine 
represented more in its own terms. Only one outlet, 15min, mentioned 
Lithuania positively more than 50% of the time, with Delfi.lt and Lrytas 
being more neutral. Latvian outlets shared the Estonian tendency to frame 
Ukraine more as a secondary or minor actor: Latvia was an actor in more 
than half of stories from Delfi.lv and LSM and just under half of those from 
TVnet. Across stories, however, the Latvian portrayal of Ukraine was the 
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least positive: the tone was positive more than half of the time in Delfi.
lv stories, but just under half of the time in LSM or TVnet stories. The 
public service outlets in Estonia and Latvia (ERR and LSM, respectively) 
both differed slightly in their coverage from private outlets in that they 
were more likely to use a local hook in their stories and to cast their own 
countries as major actors.
Table 4. Summary of Media Storylines Framing Ukraine in Terms of 
Capability, Opportunity, and Affinity
Capability Opportunity Affinity
Politics Storyline 1 
Ukraine’s external affairs
Weak Threat to Baltic Like us
Storyline 2 





Ukraine’s internal affairs #2
Weak Threat to Baltic Lower
Economy Storyline 4 














Ukraine’s social affairs #1
Weak Opportunity Not like us/
lower
Storyline 7 
Ukraine’s social affairs #2
Capable Opportunity Like us/
better
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of research.
The political issue-area dominated the framing of coverage in all three 
countries, but as Table 4 shows, it produced three different “storylines” 
in which capability, opportunity, and affinity were represented in different 
ways. In stories in which Ukraine was a major actor, the political news 
focused both on international relations (typically the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict) and domestic news (typically Ukrainian domestic political devel-
opments). The former category of news reported on Europe’s “forgotten 
war” in the East of Ukraine. Other stories in this category included Russia’s 
capture of Ukrainian ships in the Azov Sea and various forms of Russian 
aggression and propaganda surrounding Ukraine’s prospects of joining 
NATO. Ukraine was “like us” in these stories of Russian threat, but at the 
same time a country with weak capability and framed in terms of the threat 
to the Baltics, which might be next in line. This “storyline” appeared to us 
to offer support for H3: the media of the three Baltic states used Ukraine 
as a reference point to frame their respective countries as security field 
“experts” who know Russia and can warn the rest of Europe about the 
threat emanating from Russia. 
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Ukraine was reported on in terms of reform to its governance 
structures, the anniversary of the Maidan, and its aspirations to become 
a NATO member, but also in terms of a lack of progress in fighting 
corruption. Numerous reports dealt with the arms trading scandal that 
involved then-president Poroshenko and his colleagues; major problems 
with the Ukrainian Anti-Corruption Office and a statement by then-U.S. 
Ambassador Yovavich calling for the situation to be addressed urgently; 
and the discovery of secret Western bank accounts belonging to former 
president Yanukovich. In some of these stories, Ukraine was framed as 
growing in capability, providing each Baltic state with opportunity in the 
form of an ally that is another democratic country in the region, potentially 
within NATO, the main guarantor of security for the Baltic states. In these 
media “storylines,” Ukraine is becoming more “like us” for the three 
Baltic states and framed in terms of affinity. Ukraine’s liminal status and 
move “toward Europe” then validates the acquired “Europeanness” of each 
Baltic state, who are framed in these reports as “Euro-Enthusiastic Baltic 
States” (providing support for H2). 
Yet in other news reports in this category, the “storyline” is clearly of 
a weak Ukraine that is corrupt and in need of reform and better governance. 
It stands as a reminder of old Soviet, non-European ways and is therefore 
less opportunity, more threat, and “not like us” because it is not on the same 
normative level. This “storyline” presents Ukraine as a particular reference 
for each Baltic state: they are already “in Europe,” as they have different 
(better) norms than Ukraine (providing support for H1), and Ukraine can 
learn from each state in this regard (providing support for H4). Political 
reporting during the period was not reducible to a coherent view of Ukraine 
but produced different “storylines” in which capability, opportunity, and 
affinity varied and in which strategic narratives were accessed in quite 
different ways.
Reporting on economic and social issues was also varied but was 
both less prominent and more often framed in terms of each Baltic country 
than in terms of Ukraine. There were, for example, multiple reports on 
a Latvian bank that got into trouble due to money-laundering schemes, 
many of which involved Ukrainian money, as well as on a major Estonian 
company, Baltika, that withdrew its business from Ukraine due to low 
returns. Particularly in Latvia, Ukraine was extensively mentioned in the 
context of financial crimes, tax violations, and illegal activities around 
banks. Ukraine frequently emerges in economic terms as a country with 
low capability that is a threat to Baltic business and has low affinity to 
Baltic liberal market values. This framing of Ukraine in secondary terms 
in stories on Baltic business lends support to H1—that is, Ukraine is used 
to craft an image of the Baltic states steadily “returning to Europe,” where 
the norms are different from norms in Ukraine. In this “storyline,” Ukraine 
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is lagging behind in modernizing its society, in contrast to the Baltic states. 
However, Ukraine’s economy did not only attract negative media 
attention. The three countries also paid attention to successful Ukrainian 
businesses, including innovative start-ups in the Baltic countries and new 
air routes connecting the Baltic states with Ukraine. In these Baltic-centric 
economic news stories, Ukraine is represented in terms of capability and 
the opportunity that it provides when it is aligned with the liberal market 
values embraced by each of the three Baltic states. This “storyline” lends 
support to H4, in which the Baltic states are positioned as a model or 
example for Ukraine. 
That contrasting picture in local angles on Ukraine was reflected also 
in the small number of stories engaged in social or cultural reporting. In 
stories on Ukrainian labor migrants, Ukraine showed weak capability and 
was presented as “not like us,” the Baltic states. However, some stories 
emphasized reports about skilled migrants, particularly in Lithuanian 
reports on individual migrants, and presented Ukraine as an opportunity for 
both the Baltics and Europe. This “storyline” offers support for H4, which 
frames the three Baltic states as a new “core” attractive to the “periph-
eries” constituted by the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine. In 
stories on sport and culture (particularly in Latvia), Ukraine was framed 
as successful in a great number of creative areas, with most events taking 
place in the relevant Baltic state: classical music, jazz, music festivals, 
theatre, performing arts, photo exhibitions, book festivals, poetry readings, 
sports. Ukraine’s capability, the opportunity its people represented to the 
Baltics, and their cultural affinity produced a quite distinct “storyline” that 
provided support for H1: Ukraine is a reference point for the three Baltic 
states in the sense that “we all belong to Europe.” 
In sum, media in the three Baltic states followed the same pattern in 
representing Ukraine: it was presented very much in relation to Estonia, 
Latvia, or Lithuania through a distinct set of affinity/non-affinity dyads in 
which Ukraine was both weak and growing in capability, a threat and an 
opportunity. There was an almost equal split of weak vs. growing capabil-
ity, opportunity vs. threat and affinity (like us vs. not like us) across both 
political and socio-economic topics. The resulting “storylines” that lend 
support to the four hypotheses can be understood not just as varied, but 
also as constituting an uncertain picture in cognitive, emotive, and norma-
tive terms. In each “storyline,” the meanings oscillated between positive/
promising and bleak/negative. Thirty years after the collapse of the USSR, 
the Baltic media still have not made up their minds and project deeply split, 
contradictory frames of Ukraine.
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Perceptions among Young Multipliers and Influencers 
We observed major similarities in the outlooks of the young multipli-
ers and influencers in the three Baltic countries, all of which resonated 
with media “storylines.” Cognitive meanings reflected a vision of each 
Baltic state as “European,” EU-focused, Euro-enthusiastic, and with 
European values when elites reflected on Ukraine in the three samples. 
These Self-reflections carried strong positive evaluations. In another 
cognitive mapping, respondents shared a perception of Ukraine as having 
experienced similar historical trauma to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. 
For interviewees, this shared painful experience helps the Baltic states 
understand Ukraine better than other EU countries (providing additional 
support to H3: Ukraine as a tool for stressing the “expertise” of the three 
Baltic states in this geopolitical region). Because of this, the three groups 
of respondents agreed that their respective countries should continue 
to help Ukraine (providing support for H2: reliable and capable Baltic 
states are now able to extend a helping hand to a volatile Ukraine). A 
cross-sample recognition of similar historical challenges did not prevent 
respondents from stressing a major difference in the present, namely 
normative divergence (a normative element of the imagery). In the eyes 
of young multipliers and influencers from the Baltic states, Ukraine is still 
“post-Soviet,” with values that differ markedly from the European/Western 
values of peace, tolerance, and the rule of law (providing support for H1: 
Ukraine is used to demonstrate the Baltic states’ firm move toward the 
European normative “core”). 
Mixed emotive images appeared: Ukraine’s efforts to revise its 
normative foundations (in particular through democracy) were seen in 
a positive light. Yet elites saw Ukraine lagging behind in embracing 
European values due to the strong inertia of “Eastern”/“Oriental”/“post-
Soviet” normative outlooks (providing further support for H1: Ukraine is 
used as a point of comparison to stress that the three Baltic states have 
departed Europe’s periphery, where Ukraine currently is, for the European 
“core”). Cognitively, respondents in the three locations singled out corrup-
tion as the main divide and a major disadvantage for Ukraine’s capability 
to succeed on the road to Europe economically and politically (providing 
some support for H1 as well as H4, where reference to Ukraine invites a 
positive self-reflection as a model/example governed by the rule of law for 
other post-Soviet states besieged by corruption). 
Strong similarities in perceptions of Ukraine and the Selves across 
the three interview samples—in addition to the resonances across the three 
countries for the media “storylines” in cognitive, emotive and normative 
images of Self, Other, and Self-Other relations—allow us to argue for 
existing shared regional networks of meanings. In these networks, the case 
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of liminal Ukraine—something Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can relate 
to—is used as a reference point to convey a message that each Baltic state 
is moving toward the European “core” and away from the “periphery” 
where Ukraine currently is. Employing Ukraine as a reference point seems 
to be a shared strategy on the part of the three Baltic countries for re-shap-
ing their identity narrative among agenda-setters. Arguably, this regionally 
shared strategy does not contradict the Baltic states’ determination to craft 
individual country “brands” within the EU, the region, and the world.
We did observe some differences in how meanings were “bundled” 
when engagement was considered in terms of perceived capability, oppor-
tunity, and affinity. Opinions by Lithuanian and Latvian respondents were 
more closely aligned to each other than to visions from Estonia. Latvian 
and Lithuanian interviewees were more inclined to see Ukraine as promis-
ing and intriguing, with distinct opportunities in the economic and business 
spheres (echoing the media “storyline” 5 discussed above and providing 
support to H4: Ukraine is used to underline the image of these two Baltic 
states as a “core” in contrast to Ukraine’s status as a new “reliable” 
periphery). Estonian respondents, meanwhile, tended to see Ukraine’s 
economy as backward (resonating with media “storyline” 4 and thus 
providing support to H1: Estonia used Ukraine to solidify its self-vision as 
already part of the European economic “core”). Estonian respondents also 
stressed a need for a pragmatic attitude toward Ukraine, not to be confused 
with friendship (providing further support to H4: Ukraine is framed as a 
“periphery” rather distant from Estonia, which, guided by certain norms 
and principles, is at the “core”). Interviewees in the other two countries 
saw Ukraine as a friend, some even as a brother (the latter vision was more 
frequent in Lithuania) (echoing media “storyline” 7 and arguably offering 
further support to H3 with regard to why the Baltic states should offer a 
helping hand to Ukraine). Another important distinction was the visibility 
of and attitudes toward Ukrainian labor migrants, which is a relatively new 
phenomenon in interactions between the Baltics and Ukraine (providing 
support to H4: Ukraine is framed as a periphery not just to Europe but to 
the Baltic states, which emerge as a “new core”). The case of Ukrainian 
labor migrants highlights disparities in income, welfare, and standards of 
living between the three Baltic states—post-Soviet countries that became 
EU members—and Ukraine, which “missed the train.” Estonian reflections 
tend to be more negative, with migrants seen as carrying Other values into 
Estonian society (resonating with media “storyline” 6 and in support of 
H1), whereas Lithuanian reflections noted that it is other EU countries that 
are pragmatically taking advantage of Ukrainian migrant labor.
Of the three, Estonian respondents were most inclined to describe 
Estonia as a model for other post-Soviet states, including Ukraine (provid-
ing support for H4). Historical links were not a dominant reflection. The 
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view that Ukraine must work hard to move toward Europe—“do it itself,” 
like Estonia did—was frequently expressed (providing support for H1). 
Latvian responses stressed a vision of a forward-thinking Latvia. At the 
same time, the theme of liminal identity featured prominently: Latvia was 
described as a “bridge” between Ukraine and Europe (L1) and a “transition 
between Eastern and Northern Europe” (L3). This resonates with Latvia’s 
vision of Ukraine as possessing a similar liminal status—i.e., being a 
“buffer” country located between two normative poles and geopolitical 
“heavyweights,” namely Russia and the EU. It is also indicative of a certain 
identity confusion. Lithuanian responses highlighted a narrative of a “brave 
Ukraine” that is not afraid to stand up to a major aggressor. This narrative 
paralleled Lithuania’s own Self-vision as a small but brave and outspoken 
country in the EU and the world (providing support for H2 and H3: using 
Ukraine to formulate a self-vision as already in the “core” of Europe and 
as an expert on security in the region). Lithuanian responses also stood out 
for their reflections on the risks of the European integration process for 
themselves and—should it join the EU—for Ukraine. They further noted 
a fading narrative of Lithuania as a friend of Ukraine (arguably providing 
support for H4: Ukraine serves to underline the growing “core” status of 
Lithuania vis-à-vis Ukraine, which is increasingly a “periphery” in rela-
tion to Lithuania rather than a periphery equal to Lithuania in relation to 
Europe).
Discussion
Our research found support for the four hypothesized narratives. Reflecting 
on these global and regional changes, opinion- and agenda-setting 
discourses, and interviews with multipliers and influencers with the 
potential to set future agendas in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia explicated 
an existing shared regional strategy to use Ukraine to trigger a particular 
network of meanings. This network is activated to modify an identity 
narrative of the three Baltic states—away from the image of a reliable, 
eternally liminal “periphery” to Europe that will never be the center to a 
more assertive narrative of these states approaching the European “core” 
and shedding “periphery” status or even already being in the “core.” This is 
a novel characteristic of the NAS Model, which is typically nation-focused. 
Importantly, in evoking Ukraine as a reference point to shift identity narra-
tives in each state, the three countries resonate with each other in producing 
a set of particular “storylines” that induce a split image of Ukraine among 
Baltic audiences. On the one hand, the three Baltic states continue to 
formulate cognitive, emotive, and normative meanings that demonstrate 
ongoing approval of Ukraine’s European choice and readiness to help and 
support Ukraine in this choice and on its path toward Europe. On the other 
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hand, they share meanings that carry the potential to challenge the exist-
ing narrative of the Baltic states as unequivocal supporters and friends of 
Ukraine, its European choice, and its position in the conflict with Russia.
1. We found deeply split “storylines” in cognitive, emotive, 
and normative terms in each thematic frame in media (politics, 
economy, social affairs) and for the categories of capability, 
opportunity, and affinity observed across thematic frames. 
The third level of agenda setting predicts this, as the model 
suggests that the “news media can actually bundle different 
objects and attributes and make these bundles of elements 
salient in the public’s mind simultaneously.”61 Significantly, 
what we observe are consistent splits and thematic frames at 
the opposite ends for each category. This suggests uncertainty. 
Yet as our empirical analysis demonstrated, these “split” 
images of Ukraine are in place not to tell a story of Ukraine, but 
to serve as a reference in the revision of the identity narratives 
of each of the three Baltic states—i.e., moving from being a 
“reliable periphery of Europe” to being in its “core.”
 
2. Our content analysis found that media framings of Ukraine 
in terms of visibility, local resonance, and emotive charge 
carried different emphases in the news in the three Baltic coun-
tries. Yet when analyzed in terms of meanings and relations/
associations between them, as indicated by the NAS Model, 
the three media samples revealed remarkably similar ways 
in which they combined cognitive, emotive, and normative 
meanings, i.e., “split storylines” contributing to the same 
meta-narratives of identity. As such, we argue that there is a 
shared “regional” strategy to activate the network of meanings 
in the revision of the identity narrative via agenda-setting 
discourses on popular e-news platforms.
3. Our comparative analysis of young multipliers’ and influ-
encers’ perceptions of Self, Other, and Self-Other relations 
also highlights a number of striking similarities across the 
three countries. These were dominated by a normative image 
element. Importantly, it indicates that for the young genera-
tion of agenda-setters, their country is already unquestionably 
European, as it lives by Western “core” norms and values, 
whereas Ukraine has not adopted these progressive norma-
tive outlooks and clings to old values such as corruption 
61 Guo, Vu, and McCombs, “An Expanded Perspective on Agenda-Setting Effects.”
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(providing support for H1). The new generation of multipliers 
and influencers also see their countries—and themselves—as 
passionately European and EU-enthusiastic (providing support 
for H2). At the same time, views about Ukraine as an oppor-
tunity for these states in the economic and political spheres 
diverged between countries. 
4. We found a number of resonances in mapping and relating 
cognitive, emotive, and normative meanings between media 
“storylines” and how young multipliers and influencers from 
the media and civil society sectors of the three countries 
imagine Ukraine and its relations with the EU and their own 
country. These resonances constitute a scope of condition for 
narrative change. The interviews demonstrate that the way 
respondents see the Other (Ukraine) is ultimately about the 
way they see themselves: a successful model of post-Soviet 
transformation in Estonia, a forward-looking Latvia, and a 
brave Lithuania.62 The story of the Self that emerged through 
interviews also demonstrated the “fluidity of mental borders” 
(a concept addressed in the Introduction to the Special Issue). 
Young Baltic multipliers and influencers see themselves and 
their countries as belonging to the EU/Europe and the generic 
“West” and as being firmly outside the post-Soviet space. 
It seems the liminal identity argued by substantial literature 
on the region may be less applicable to young people, who 
comprise the next generation of voters, decision-, opinion- 
and policy-makers. In contrast, Ukraine, used to re-assert the 
“Europeanness” of the Baltic states, is imagined as remaining 
within the post-Soviet/“Eastern” (if not Oriental) realm and 
as being not yet in the European normative space; it remains 
a periphery, and potentially not a very reliable one. These 
shared meanings of “imaginary borders” that split Ukraine 
and the three Baltic states into new “core” and “periphery” 
are potentially of concern for the future of Ukraine-Baltic 
state relations.63
5. Such images point to an emerging narrative of detachment 
and potentially disengagement (as captured in Lithuania, 
where the narrative of “being a friend to Ukraine” seems 
to be fading). This evolution in meanings clashes with the 
current official strategic narrative of the Baltic states as 
62 See Heinrichs and Sabatovych in this issue.
63 See also Didelon-Loiseau and Richard in this issue.
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ardent supporters of Ukraine’s European choice who side 
with Ukraine in its conflict with Russia and advocate for and 
champion Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Thirty years after the 
collapse of the USSR, the media and the new generation of 
multipliers and influencers demonstrate a growing perceptual 
disconnect and are at a very sharp tipping point. Generational 
change among opinion-makers means that strategic identity 
narratives are far from safely enshrined.
This paper asserted a shared regional strategy among the three Baltic 
states—evident in news discourse and the comments of young multipliers 
and influencers—to use Ukraine as a reference point to trigger a network 
of meanings in the process of the identity narrative revisions. This study 
opens up a number of further questions that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. Future research may extend this inquiry to the other EU countries 
and compare the networks of meanings in individual EU member states 
and/or regions. Future research could explore narratives projected by 
official discourses vis-a-vis media “storylines” and opinions expressed 
by young multipliers and influencer. Future studies may also choose to 
expand the samples, include more news sources from traditional media as 
well as social media, and interview multipliers and influencers from older 
age cohorts. Further future studies would allow us to test how well the 
theoretical framework constructed here could explain the meaning-making 
of practices in other countries and international organizations.
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